Do presidents inevitably lose support the longer they are in office? Does the public invariably rally behind presidents during international crises? What are the criteria by which the public forms its judgment about whether or not the president is doing a good job? And what is the role of daily news reporting and elite opinion in shaping the public's perception of the president's performance? This book addresses these questions and many others surrounding the dynamics of fluctuating public support for the president of the United States. Drawing its case material from the modern presidency from Kennedy through Reagan, with looks backward as far as Truman, this innovative work shows how the standing of the president with the American people has come to have a political life of its own. The author first examines two seemingly distinctive periods of opinion formation: the 'honeymoon' at the beginning of a presidential term and the 'rally' of presidential support that accompanies international crises. He then analyzes two previous explanations of public support - length of term in office and the state of the economy - and concludes that these explanations are, respectively, incorrect and incomplete. The author presents a model of information processing that ties public support to indications of policy success or failure brought to the attention of the public through daily news reporting by the media. The model is tested initially for the presidencies of Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford; it is then refined and tested further for the Carter and Reagan presidencies.
Volume 116 of Terrorism: Commentary on Security Documents, Assessing President Obama's National Security Strategy extends the previous volumes on the Administration's national security policy by highlighting its specific strategies. The volume provides an assessment of the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Obama Administration's strategy on preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It also includes assessments of the Administration's position on states' rights in controlling illegal aliens, the Department of State's foreign operations, and the Afghanistan strategy. Finally, documents assessing the relationship of terrorism to criminality and weapons of mass destruction nonproliferation strategy for Iran are also provided. The documents and assessments in this volume help readers identify the challenges of implementing a national security strategy.
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, and International Security
The EFQM Excellence Model was introduced at the beginning of 1992 as the framework for assessing organizations for the annual European Excellence Award . It is now the most widely used organizational assessment framework in Europe. Most users have no intention of applying to win awards; they use the framework and analysis techniques within the model as diagnostic tools that will help them to:assess the health of their organization, identify its strengths and areas for improvement and periodically measure progressidentify and share good management practices, both internally and externallyanticipate and target their desired results in tangible, measurable waysWhether you are a newcomer to the Excellence Model, or an experienced user (whose techniques of performance assessment maybe rigorous but have possibly evolved to become overly complex), this Management Guide provides you with practical techniques to undertake timely and effective assessments. It explains the history, basis and evolution of the EFQM Excellence Model, the nature of EFQM and its networks today, and, most importantly, provides step-by-step guidance, together with a series of analysis pro-formas, to enable readers to facilitate an assessment of an organization against each of the 32 elements ( criterion parts ) of the EFQM Excellence Model.
Applies psychoanalytic theory to Obama's personality and behavior during his first two years as president, examining how his childhood experiences affected his political ideology, leadership style, and quest for redemption in his political life.
The Department of Defense (DOD) supports basic research to advance fundamental knowledge in fields important to national defense. Over the past six years, however, several groups have raised concern about whether the nature of DOD-funded basic research is changing. The concerns include these: Funds are being spent for research that does not fall under DOD's definition of basic research; reporting requirements have become cumbersome and onerous; and basic research is handled differently by the three services. To explore these concerns, the Congress directed DOD to request a study from the National Research Council (NRC) about the nature of basic research now being funded by the Department. Specifically the NRC was to determine if the programs in the DOD basic research portfolio are consistent with the DOD definition of basic research and with the characteristics associated with fundamental research.
Choice Outstanding Title H. R. Haldeman, President Nixon's former chief of staff, is said to have boasted: "Every president needs a son of a bitch, and I'm Nixon's. I'm his buffer and I'm his bastard. I get done what he wants done and I take the heat instead of him." Richard Ellis explores the widely discussed but poorly understood phenomenon of presidential "lightning rods"--cabinet officials who "take the heat" instead of their bosses. Whether by intent or circumstance, these officials divert criticism and blame away from their presidents. The phenomenon is so common that it's assumed to be an essential item in every president's managerial toolbox. But, Ellis argues, such assumptions can oversimplify our understanding of this tool. Ellis advises against indiscriminate use of the lightning rod metaphor. Such labeling can hide as much as it reveals about presidential administration and policymaking at the cabinet level. The metaphor often misleads by suggesting strategic intent on the president's part while obscuring the calculations and objectives of presidential adversaries and the lightning rods themselves. Ellis also illuminates the opportunities and difficulties that various presidential posts--especially secretaries of state, chiefs of staff, and vice presidents--have offered for deflecting blame from our presidents. His study offers numerous detailed and instructive examples from the administrations of Truman (Dean Acheson); Eisenhower (Richard Nixon, John Foster Dulles, Herbert Brownell, and Ezra Taft Benson); LBJ (Hubert Humphrey); Ford (Henry Kissinger); and Reagan (James Watt). These examples, Ellis suggests, should guide our understanding of the relationship between lightning rods and presidential leadership, policymaking, and ratings. Blame avoidance, he warns, does have its limitations and may even backfire at times. Nevertheless, President Clinton and his successors may need to rely on such tools. The presidency, Ellis points out, finds itself the object of increasingly intense partisan debate and microscopic scrutiny by a wary press. Lightning rods can deflect such heat and help the president test policies, gauge public opinion, and protect his political power and public image. Ellis's book is an essential primer for helping us understand this process.