Soviet Military Strategy in Europe focuses on the development, form and content, implications for international relations, and goal of Soviet military plan in Europe. The book first discusses the foundation of Soviet military thought and revolution in Soviet military affairs, including basic concepts of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, Soviet study of military affairs, nuclear revolution, and scientific and technical revolution. The publication also concentrates on Soviet study of laws and principles of military art and forces and primary operational concepts. Topics include laws of the first order, naval and air operations, nuclear strike, and conventional war considerations. The manuscript ponders on command and control, as well as combat modeling, survivability, coordination, centralization, and attack of NATO command and control. The book also reviews the issues of Soviet military strategy toward Europe and special Soviet problems. Topics include role of nuclear weapons, chemical warfare options, escalation to intercontinental war, NATO nuclear threat, nuclear weapon stockpile, and superiority and war initiation. The publication is a dependable reference for readers interested in the Soviet military scheme in Europe.
Armed revolution and civil war gave birth to the Soviet Union, world War II propelled it to global pre-eminence, and the Cold War contributed to the Soviet Union's demise. Given Marxism-Leninism's idological preoccupation with war and threats of war, it is understandable that the spectre of war should play a vital role in the life and fate of the Soviet state. This study of Soviet military strategy is based upon the twin pillars of Soviet political-military actions and Soviet writings on the subject of military strategy. Thanks to the policy of glasnost, it incorporates Soviet materials hitherto unavailable in the West. It aims to be not simply a retrospective account of what was, but to form part of the context for what will be in the future.
Military planners, theoreticians, and practitioners present 17 essays insisting on the continuing importance of the Central Region of Germany in NATO's defense policy, though it is no longer a border. Among the considerations are the overall strategies of NATO and the (former) Soviet Union, nuclear
This book, first published in 1984, carefully examine the political debate surrounding nuclear weapons and superpower polices in Cold War Western Europe. It seeks to analyse a distinctly European view in Soviet policy, as opposed to a superpower view. It examines Soviet domestic and foreign policy, economic and military practice, with the aim of understanding and countering the Soviet threat to Western Europe.
Enkeltafsnit: Détente, Moscow's View - Dedision making in the USSR - Soviet Policy and the Domestic Politics of Western Europe - Soviet-East European Relations - Soviet Military Capabilities and Intentions in Europe - Soviet Military Posture and Policy in Europe - Soviet Economic Relations with Western Europe - West European Economic Relations with the Soviet Union
In the first analysis of the start of the Cold War from a Soviet viewpoint, Caroline Kennedy-Pipe draws on Russian source material to reach some startling conclusions. She challenges the prevailing orthodoxy of Western historians to show how Moscow saw the presence of US troops in Europe in the 1940s and early 1950s as advantageous rather than as a check on Soviet ambitions. The author points to a complex web of concerns than fuelled Moscow's actions, and explores how the Soviet leadership, and Stalin in particular, responded to American policy. She shows how the Soviet experience of the United States and Europe, both before, during and after the Second World War, led Moscow to a policy that was not simply fuelled by anti-Americanism. Six chapters cover events from the wartime conferences of 1943 until the death of Stalin. A final chapter places the book in the context of the current debate over the causes of the Cold War.
This book, first published in 1981, is an analysis of the Soviet Union’s military strategy, taking in both sides of the ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ views of the USSR’s intentions. It examines the Soviet approach to nuclear war, defence and deterrence in the nuclear age and the calculation of risk in the use of the military instrument. One of the main themes running through the chapters is that although the Soviet Union clearly does not view military issues in the same way as does the West, their approach is not necessarily aggressive and dangerous in all respects.
At the end of the Cold War security concerns are more about regional and civil conflicts than nuclear or Eurasian global wars. Stephen Cimbala argues that deterrence characteristics of the pre-Cold War period will in the 21st century again become normative.
