During the Cold War, Westerners were obsessed with the military policies of the Soviet Union. Until the demise of the Soviet Union, however, few details of Moscow's thinking on military matters were available. In this book, Andrei Kokoshin reveals how Soviet military theorists developed and debated the concepts that provided the basis for the Kremlin's defense policies. Drawing on Soviet-era archives and unpublished materials, he sheds light on this important chapter in the history of Russia and the world.The book covers three main themes: the relationship between politics and military strategy in the Soviet Union; how the Soviet political and military leadership assessed threats to Soviet security, the nature of future wars, and methods of warfare; and the relationship between offense and defense in Soviet military strategy. Kokoshin places the strategic concepts behind Moscow's military policies in the context of internal and international struggles for power, and assesses the future role of military power in Russia's national security strategy.
This book, first published in 1981, examines the influences affecting Soviet military thinking planning and theory in the later Cold War. It offers for the first time an insight into the range of premises and calculations surrounding the Soviet conception of power, and makes the connection between Soviet studies and military strategy, a link often missed in the West. It discusses comparative doctrines, cultural differences, arms control and specific security challenges between East and West.
First published in 1982, this study traces the development of Soviet military thinking on the Third World and assesses its importance for the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. Changes in Soviet military thought often reflect changes in Soviet attitudes towards and expectations from involvement in Third World conflicts. This work from Dr. Katz meditates upon the changing role of the USSR in post-war Third World conflicts, with particular emphasis upon the Brezhnev era and the way in which US setbacks in the Third World impacted upon Soviet foreign policy and changing attitudes to the Third World.
This study of Soviet military thinking over the last 75 years combines the perspectives of history and the social sciences to understand Soviet military doctrine, strategy, and behavior from the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 to the coup attempt and revolution in 1991. Senior scholars evaluate Soviet ways of war, assess the current situation in the Soviet Union/Russia, and point to future possible policy directions. Statements defining recent Soviet policy, enhanced by an overall Soviet perspective, further reveal current military attitudes in the region. A bibliographical essay points to significant literature on Soviet military doctrine.
This book analyzes the evolution of Russian military thought and how Russia's current thinking about war is reflected in recent crises. While other books describe current Russian practice, Oscar Jonsson provides the long view to show how Russian military strategic thinking has developed from the Bolshevik Revolution to the present. He closely examines Russian primary sources including security doctrines and the writings and statements of Russian military theorists and political elites. What Jonsson reveals is that Russia's conception of the very nature of war is now changing, as Russian elites see information warfare and political subversion as the most important ways to conduct contemporary war. Since information warfare and political subversion are below the traditional threshold of armed violence, this has blurred the boundaries between war and peace. Jonsson also finds that Russian leaders have, particularly since 2011/12, considered themselves to be at war with the United States and its allies, albeit with non-violent means. This book provides much needed context and analysis to be able to understand recent Russian interventions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, how to deter Russia on the eastern borders of NATO, and how the West must also learn to avoid inadvertent escalation.
Soviet Military Strategy in Europe focuses on the development, form and content, implications for international relations, and goal of Soviet military plan in Europe. The book first discusses the foundation of Soviet military thought and revolution in Soviet military affairs, including basic concepts of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, Soviet study of military affairs, nuclear revolution, and scientific and technical revolution. The publication also concentrates on Soviet study of laws and principles of military art and forces and primary operational concepts. Topics include laws of the first order, naval and air operations, nuclear strike, and conventional war considerations. The manuscript ponders on command and control, as well as combat modeling, survivability, coordination, centralization, and attack of NATO command and control. The book also reviews the issues of Soviet military strategy toward Europe and special Soviet problems. Topics include role of nuclear weapons, chemical warfare options, escalation to intercontinental war, NATO nuclear threat, nuclear weapon stockpile, and superiority and war initiation. The publication is a dependable reference for readers interested in the Soviet military scheme in Europe.